Abstract-A Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) is a valuable tool to represent the causal relationships that exist in a given set of variables. This paper presents a methodology for organizational risk analysis for safety management. Learning a BBN from data is a difficult and resource-consuming task, we presents the implementation of a greedy algorithm that automatically constructs a BBN from a dataset of cases obtained. The resulting BBN reflect installation specific factors respect to organizational factors and show the dependencies that exist among key variables that are associated to the trip generation process.
I. INTRODUCTION
Complex socio-technical systems are comprised of physical system and human system. The performance of a complex socio-technical system is dependent on the interaction of technical, human, social, organizational, managerial and environmental factors [1] . Safety performances often depend on complex and distributed interactions between human operators and technical systems. In the present dynamic society, a very fast pace of change of technology is found at the operative level of society within many domains, and the rapid development of information and communication technology have leaded to a high degree of integration and coupling of systems and the effects of a single decision can have dramatic effects that propagate rapidly and widely through the global society. Living in a very aggressive and competitive environment, companies today would focus the incentives of decision makers on short term financial and survival criteria rather than long term criteria concerning safety. It is widely recognized that accidents in which 'human error' plays a part are often not solely attributable to errors made by an operator but have deeper causes, arising from the behavior of many others within the organizational context of a system [2] . Investigations of accidents in complex systems have shown that events attributed to human error and blamed on an operator have systemic causes, such as procedural or organizational weaknesses. Many such failures and accidents do not have a simple explanation, particularly those that have significant contributions from human and organizational behaviors. Increasing interest over the past two decades in causal modeling of organizational safety behavior is in part motivated by the desire to understand the deeper more fundamental causes of accidents and incidents. Reason [8] describes the gradual relaxation of safety alertness following a period of safe operation, followed by increased alertness after an accident as 'currents in the safety space'. Rusmussen [3] stresses environmental pressure will cause the operation of a system to migrate towards the boundary of safety. To analyze the risk of accidents and to improve safety, organizational risk factors need to be understood and evaluated. Several frameworks for analyzing the organizational context of accidents have been proposed, but without the capability to assess risks numerically. Event trees are usually used to model accident process, while organizational weaknesses have only an indirect effect on the accident and are therefore not readily represented as events. We outline an alternative method, using Bayesian Networks to model accidents, with explicit representation of both events and root causes.
II. APPLICATIONS OF BBN IN ORGANIZATIONAL RISK ANALYSIS

A. Bayesian Belief Network
Bayesian probability has existed for many years. Implementation algorithms and software tools have become available in recent years. Bayesian Networks are a network-based framework for representing and analyzing models involving uncertainty. They handle uncertainty in a mathematically rigorous yet efficient and simple way compared with other knowledge-based systems. Due to its power to deal with the soft data in reliability, it has stimulated a strong interest [4] . A Bayesian Belief Network consists of a set of variables (causes and effects) and a set of directed edges between variables (paths of influence). Each variable has a finite set of mutually exclusive states. The variables together with the directed edges form a directed acyclic graph (DAG). Conditional probabilities carry the strength of the links between the causes and their potential effects. For example for a given state of a variable A with parents B1, …, Bn, we have the conditional probability of the state (A) occurring given the state of the contributing parent nodes: P(A|B1, …, Bn). Bayes' theorem in the subjective theory of probability is at the core of the inference engine of BBNs. In the definition of Bayesian Belief Networks, the DAG restriction is critical. Feedback cycles are difficult to model quantitatively and no calculus has been developed for causal networks that can cope with feedback cycles in a reasonably general way. 
B. Organizational risks factors
The empirical studies of organizational safety performance have revealed a number of organizational factors in developing a predictive causal model of organizational risks. In Bella's view, large organizations are complex systems, which adaptively change and self-organize, the global patterns of organizational behavior that tend to reduce the safety of systems are common to all systems. Biondi (1998) [5] states that the organization system can have an affect on the reliability through numerous interrelated ways, such as work overload, time pressure and systemic distortion of information. Many recent disasters happened not because of the way that safety was managed through the formal controls and procedures, but because of the safety culture in which safety management approaches were implemented [6] . Safety culture is a sub-facet of organizational culture and is defined as common safety value in organization [7] . Certain works on the organizational factors have been devoted mainly to the classification of such factors. Embrey(1992) [8] analyzes railway accidents in the United Kingdom, and points that organizational risks factors have three levels: Level 1 includes latent, active, and recovery errors; Level 2 includes error-inducing factors such as training, procedures, time pressure, responsibilities, etc.; and Level 3 includes policy deficiencies such as project management, safety culture, training policy, etc. Davoudian (1994) [9] proves that organizational factors should include overall culture (communication, decision making, etc.) and certain attributes of decision making, communication, etc. Leveson (2004) [10] views safety as a control problem and managed by a control structure developed for a socio-technical system.
III. BUILD BBN MODEL OF ORGANIZATIONAL SAFETY RISKS
For risk management purpose, it is necessary to have a technique that is capable of assessing the impacts of potential changes. BBNs can be applied for predicting the effects of changes [11] . As a "probabilistic" technique rooted in Artificial Intelligence, BBN has the capability of utilizing subjective expert opinions. Adapting this technique makes the quantification of the organizational accident causation theory possible, even with a lack of actual data. Figure 2 shows a schematic process model representing hierarchical structure of the process system of an organization, different activities at different layers construct organizational safety activities. A and the output of activity C A 22 . The same logic will hold for the activities from layer 1 to layer N (the layer where the modeler stops decomposition).
The above schematic process model can be converted to BBN as shown in Figure 3 . In Figure 3 to K A , we can reach the probability of safety output with specific state. For example, considering a binary state for the factor (success and failure), by knowing the probability of success and failure for activities in layer N, and also the conditional probabilities, one can find the probability of total output being in the success state. According to scope of organizational behavior, we usually divide organizational behavior into three layers, from individual, team to organization. Shown in table 1, we select training and workload & time pressure to reflect individual level, communication, safety administration and safety decision to reflect team level, salary policy and safety culture reflect organizational level. Each node and its all possible conditions should be definite and give a conditional probability in order to analyze effect of each organizational factor on system reliability using BBN. First of all, we need consider all nodes that construct BBN comprehensively. We classify all nodes into two categories: human error nodes and organizational factors nodes which result in human errors. Then calculate conditional probability of each node based on the data sample. Human error and severe loss are selected as accident nodes. Secondly, we separate organizational factors in human error accidents database, that is to say, each organizational factor is divided into several states, and each state corresponding to a discrete value. Table 1 shows category and characteristics of human error data discretization. Table 2 shows samples of organizational factors data. Table 2 samples of organizational factors data   X1  X2  X3  X4  X5  X6  X7  X8  X9  1  1  2  1  2  1  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  1  2  1  2  2  1  1  3  1  2  2  2  2  2  3  2  1  1  3  1  3  1  2  3  2  2  2  3  2  2  1  2  2  3  3  3  2  2  3  1  1 Traditionally, BBNs were constructed from knowledge of human experts. However, during the last decade several methods had been developed to build them directly from databases. In order to ensure configuration of BBN, all variables 1 X , 2 X ,…, 9 X need to be ordered according to topology order . Father node set of each variable should be determined and partial probability of each state need to be assigned. For the purposes of this paper the 2 K algorithm was applied to database [12] . algorithm determines the optimal structure through a greedy procedure that identifies if a node can increase the network probability by adding a new parent to it, the structure of BBNs can be calculated.
The basic structure of the 2 K algorithm is described with the following pseudocode:
1. for [ ] 
else finish=true
Where n is number of nodes in the network, i π is array of parents of node i , u is maximum allowable parents that any node can have, gn is array that stores the maximum values of ( ) g associated each node, pred is array of predecessor nodes to each node i , z is prospective parent with the highest probability. Figure 3 presents structure of BBNs applied above organizational factors database. The model indicates the value of safety-minded companies creating a safety culture that enhances communicating, decision and monitoring procedures, thereby reducing human error and severe loss. This direction will probably necessitate both restructuring the net in order to account for influences that were neglected at this stage and introducing other influences on organizational behaviour, such as training and salary policy, etc. Bayesian belief networks provide a robust probabilistic method of reasoning with uncertainty and are is more suitable to represent complex dependencies among components and to include uncertainty in modeling. In this paper we have demonstrated in principle that BBNs can be used for evaluating accident probability of organizational factors. We have also shown how such a model can be used for practical applications. As stated in one of the assumptions of the K2 algorithm, an ordering of the nodes has to be established to define the structure of a BBN. The model succeeds in building a quantitative tier on top of the qualitative explanations of organizational risks. We do believe that such models can become a reliable tool for predicting influence of organizational risks changes and even in orienting safety investments at this level.
